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In 1997, the Supreme Court of the United States decided two con-
stitutional cases, each dealing with the scope of congressional power.  
In each case, the Court held a federal statute unconstitutional.  City of 
Boerne v. Flores,1 the better known of the two, found unconstitutional 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, passed by overwhelming 
numbers in both Houses of Congress in 1993 in response to the 
Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,2 which had 
abandoned prior constitutional requirements to accommodate cer-
tain religiously motivated conduct.  The Court in City of Boerne v. 
Flores concluded that Congress had overstepped its bounds, failing to 
appreciate that its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were only to enforce Section 1’s prohibitions—as the 
Court understood them.  In language widely viewed as an effort to forec-
lose congressional dialogue with the Court about constitutional in-
terpretation, the Court wrote: 
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best 
when each part of the Government respects both the Constitution and 
the proper actions and determinations of the other branches.  When the 
Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province 
of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.  
When the political branches of the Government act against the back-
ground of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it 
must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will 
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, 
including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.3 
 
 * Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter.  The author thanks Frank Michelman, Geoffrey Stone, Mark Tushnet, Jeff Clements, 
Marge Baker and Bob Taylor for their helpful discussions or comments and, of course, 
Barry Friedman, for his remarkable book that provides occasion for these reflections.  My 
thanks as well to James Razick for his able research assistance. 
 1 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 2 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding application of 
a general ban on peyote to sacramental use of the substance). 
 3 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535–36 (citations omitted). 
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In several subsequent cases, the Court found federal statutes or por-
tions thereof to be unconstitutional, as exceeding Congress’s Four-
teenth Amendment powers as limited by Boerne.4 
The other 1997 case, somewhat less far-reaching, was Printz v. 
United States.5  It, too, involved a statute enacted only a few years earli-
er, as a part of the 1993 Brady Handgun Act.  The Court in Printz 
held that a provision requiring local law enforcement officers to per-
form background checks on would-be gun purchasers for five years 
was an unconstitutional “commandeering” of state officials.  The dis-
senting opinions argued that the Constitution’s text was silent on the 
issue; the Federalist Papers seemed to assert that state executives 
would be called on to implement federal law; and other sources were 
weak or at best ambiguous on whether Congress had such power.6  It 
was, Justice Breyer’s dissent argued, therefore reasonable to consider 
the experience of other federalisms in order to determine what the 
consequences of this statute were likely to be for a healthy U.S. fede-
ralism; and in light of experience in robust European federalisms 
with centralized requirements implemented by subnational officials, 
the federal statute should be upheld.7  Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, rebuffed this effort to learn from comparative constitutional 
experience:  “We think such comparative analysis inappropriate to 
the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite 
relevant to the task of writing one.”8 
In each of these cases, the majority sought to wall off interpretive 
sources from “outside” a very limited set of materials focused primari-
ly on the Court’s own precedents.  A real accomplishment of Barry 
Friedman’s superb book, The Will of the People,9 is to show how unavail-
ing efforts are to entirely wall constitutional law off from the domain 
of public experience and opinion.  Friedman’s narrative has a rich-
ness of detail, a sense of mastery of large-scale historical trends, and 
an ease and elegance of writing that will surely make this required 
 
 4 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 5 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 6 E.g., id., at 945-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 976-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  See general-
ly Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:  Printz and Principle?, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) (criticizing Printz’s reasoning and its categorical anti-
commandeering rule, and arguing for a more flexible approach to judicial enforcement 
of federalism-based limits on congressional power). 
 7 Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 8 Id. at 921 n.11. 
 9 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
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reading for all serious students of constitutional history.  For Fried-
man, it is the ongoing interaction between the Court and the pub-
lic—in its various manifestations through legislative and executive ac-
tivity, as well as more general public opinion—that constitutes the 
genius of the American system of judicial review.  After reading 
Friedman’s book, one can have no question that shifting understand-
ings of the relationship between law and society presently, and will 
continue to, influence the Court’s understanding of the Constitution.  
Indeed, in a constitutional democracy with a difficult to amend con-
stitution, it is hard to imagine that the Court or the Constitution 
could otherwise survive. 
Friedman’s fine book raises many questions, both positive and 
normative.  As a positive matter, it is not clear whether the book de-
monstrates the influence of public opinion, or of major power hold-
ers, or what the relationship between these two are.  Moreover, it is 
not clear what public opinion is, or whose views count.  Is it the views 
of Gallup and other polls?  Is it the views of editorial writers?  Or is it 
the views of elected legislatures?  Is it something expressed over gen-
erations or something expressed in shorter time cycles?  Further, 
what are the mechanisms by which shifts in public or legislative opi-
nion affect the Court, and how do they relate to each other and the 
larger process Friedman describes?  Part I addresses these questions. 
The book also raises important normative issues.  Friedman insists 
on the following questions’ importance:  Is adjudication in the U.S. 
Supreme Court sufficiently independent from public opinion?  Is it suf-
ficiently “countermajoritarian”?  Friedman does not propose that pub-
lic opinion should in some way “count” as an independent factor in 
constitutional adjudication, from an internal perspective of how the 
Court conceptualizes its work.  But if part of the normative groun-
ding of the Court’s legitimacy lies in its relationship to public opi-
nion, what principles should guide the justices in deciding whether 
public opinion is or is not relevant on a particular point of constitu-
tional law?  Or is the question purely a prudential one?  And if the 
Court’s legitimacy is grounded in its relationship to U.S. public opi-
nion, does this have implications for the relevance of foreign expe-
rience?  Do we need a new constitutional theory to accommodate the 
answer to these questions?  I discuss these normative issues of inter-
pretation in Part II. 
Finally, the work implicitly raises questions about the role of for-
mal amendment under Article V of the Constitution and its relation-
ship to legitimate interpretation.  If, as Friedman provocatively ar-
gues, the “people” in 1937 decided that the Court had power to 
amend the Constitution, then what, if anything, is left for Article V?  
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Should we adopt a presumption against amendment, so as to avoid 
what Kathleen Sullivan describes as “constitutional amendmentitis”?10  
Or does Friedman’s work implicitly suggest a parallel risk of “consti-
tutional amendophobia”?  I discuss this briefly in Part III, in the con-
text of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. Feder-
al Election Commission.11 
I.  WHAT IS THE STORY? 
This part proceeds by way of a series of questions about the posi-
tive account Friedman offers. 
Whose will?  A striking element of the rich history Friedman pro-
vides is its description of the array of influences to which the Court 
has responded—not always “the people,” but sometimes to more par-
ticular power holders.  So, in describing the late nineteenth century, 
he writes:  “By abandoning blacks and embracing corporations the 
Court rose to the pinnacle of power.”12  Perhaps what his historical 
work shows is the Court’s responsiveness over time to power holders, a 
point that may be of some salience in this period of time after Citizens 
United. 
This positive point may have normative implications.  If it is the 
dialogue with the people that helps legitimate the Court’s power of 
judicial review in a democracy, the quality and nature of the Court’s 
dialogue depends on the quality of the democracy in which it oper-
ates.  If it is the people who hold and exercise power, then dialogue 
with that power holder will enhance the democratic accountability of 
the Court and address the countermajoritarian difficulty.  If, howev-
er, power vis-à-vis the Court is held or exercised by bodies other than 
the people, or is distorted by corrupt or abusive influences in the 
body politic, Friedman’s response to the countermajoritarian difficul-
ty is perhaps correspondingly weaker,13 unless we believe that public 
opinion can be clearly manifested without regard to these distortions. 
 
 10 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 1995, available at 
http://www.prospect.org//cs/articles?article=constitutional_amendmentitis; see also 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy:  Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment 
Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (1996) [hereinafter Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy]. 
 11 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding that independent corporate expenditures for electioneer-
ing communications cannot be prohibited under the First Amendment). 
 12 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 138; see also id. at 186 (referring to “electoral dysfunctions” as 
impairing judicial reform in the early twentieth century).  Where there are “electoral dys-
functions,” in what form is the “will of the people” heard? 
 13 On the other hand, if the product of the democratic process in the form of legislation is 
not itself entitled to respect as representing the will of the majority because of distortions 
or corruption, the countermajoritarian difficulty may be correspondingly diminished. 
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More generally, one might ask whether under Friedman’s view the 
public can develop “a will,” apart from that crystallized in the deci-
sions of the public’s representative bodies.  Sometimes, perhaps, it 
does.  But how often is our perception of public will an artifact, for 
example, of polling?  Or of the particular moment one election is 
held?  Do we care about the “will” as expressed in passive response to 
pollsters’ questions, or the “deliberative” will of the people’s repre-
sentatives acting in legislative bodies?  Given differential intensity of 
preferences and differential willingness or capacity of advocates and 
opponents to mobilize grassroots sentiment, legislation may be 
enacted that a majority is not especially happy with.  What should be 
regarded as the will of the people? 
Indeed, the people may not have “a” will but multiple “wills,” 
whose existence complicates what Friedman memorably calls the 
“bungee cord” or outer range of public tolerance of the Court’s deci-
sions.14  For example, Friedman describes congressional reaction to a 
series of decisions in 1956 and 1957 that were criticized as unduly 
protecting the rights of Communists.15  The public criticism and legis-
lative moves towards limiting the Court’s jurisdiction or overruling a 
preemption decision to allow state prosecutions of suspected subver-
sives, he suggests, may have contributed to the Court’s retrenchment 
the following term.  But what was the will of the people—was it 
represented by the criticism?  By the proposed legislation?  Or by the 
failure to enact the proposed legislation?16  Friedman comments, in a 
footnote, that “[w]here the broader public stood precisely in all this 
is anyone’s guess.”17  If not by the proposed legislation, Friedman 
suggests, perhaps the Court (or specifically, Justices Frankfurter and 
Harlan) was affected by serious academic criticism of the Court’s “ac-
tivism” or claimed lack of principle in Brown v. Board of Education.18  
Yet there have been other periods with harsh attacks on the Court 
 
 14 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 373.  For a critique of Friedman for confusing the views of edi-
torial writers with popular views in connection with the 1940s Jehovah’s Witnesses cases, 
see Justin Driver, Why Law Should Lead, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 2010, at 28, 30. 
 15 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 252-54. 
 16 On the more general problem of reading the “sounds of [legislative] silence,” compare, 
e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 262 (arguing that “even in the context of a statute’s amendment, Congress’s 
failure to ‘correct’ a settled interpretation cannot be equated with an affirmative inten-
tion to ratify that interpretation”) with Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Sta-
tute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 512–13 (suggesting that congressional inac-
tion or silence can be a relevant interpretive tool). 
 17 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 514 n.175. 
 18 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  For Friedman’s description of Learned Hand’s and Herbert Wech-
sler’s attacks on the Court, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 256–57. 
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from, for example, the American Bar Association, which did not ap-
pear to have any such effects.19  The connection between public criti-
que of Brown and the Justices’ shifts on the subversive cases is at best 
complex, for while the shift may have been away from “activism,” it 
arguably opened up the Justices to further criticism for departing 
from principle.20 
If the failed legislation in response to the 1957 domestic security 
cases represented the will of the people—or the possibility in the fu-
ture of developing a constraint on public tolerance—what was the 
role of public opinion in perhaps the most famous decision of the 
post-World War II period, Brown v. Board of Education?  Friedman re-
ports that the summer after Brown was decided, public opinion was 
running slightly in favor of the decision (though not in the South); 
and under Friedman’s theory, it matters less whether the Court led or 
followed, so long as the decision was within what the society would 
accept.  But while Friedman discusses as part of the “path to Brown” 
shifting public opinion arising out of revulsion against the German 
racist practices, he does not discuss the almost successful legislative 
effort, in early 1954, to add the so-called “Bricker Amendment” to the 
Constitution.21  The proposed Bricker Amendment was designed to 
limit the domestic legal effects of treaties; it came within one vote of 
passing the Senate in 1954, just months before Brown came down.  
One of the several concerns of some proponents of this amendment 
was to prevent reliance on the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, or other human rights instruments to invalidate 
state segregation laws.22  If introduced but not enacted legislation af-
 
 19 See, e.g., William G. Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials:  A Case Study of Why 
Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 487–92 (2002) (noting attacks on the 
Court between 1937 and 1954, including virulent attack in 1939 by the President of the 
ABA as well as threats of impeachment, and academic attacks of comparable sharpness in 
the same time period). 
 20 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 254–55 (noting observers’ concerns that the Justices 
were “reversing course in response to public discontent and threats of political reprisal”). 
 21 For a brief summary and thoughtful treatment, see Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification Of Hu-
man Rights Conventions:  The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J INT’L L. 341, 348–50 (1995).  
For longer treatments, see sources cited infra note 22. 
 22 See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY:  A TEST OF 
EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 70–71 (1988) (“Southern Democrats found the 
Bricker amendment particularly appealing because of their fear that the United Nations 
Charter, the Genocide Convention, or a covenant on human rights could be used to inva-
lidate segregation laws in the various states or enact federal civil rights legislation.”); see 
also DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS:  AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
1776–1995, at 340–42 (1996) (describing Senator Bricker’s proposed constitutional 
amendment as a direct response to the UN’s human rights initiatives); cf. MARY L. 
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:  RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 44–45 
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ter the 1957 subversives cases is arguably relevant evidence of public 
opinion, what would Professor Friedman say about the Bricker 
Amendment?  True, Bricker was not a direct response to a Supreme 
Court decision.  It might simply have been viewed as being in a dif-
ferent domain from the issues in Brown—as being primarily con-
cerned with the effect of treaties—and thus not salient.23  Yet its pub-
lic importance in the period while Brown was pending in the Supreme 
Court suggests the need to explore further the questions raised in 
this section about Friedman’s method and meaning. 
The larger point has to do with methodology and causal claims.  It 
is somewhat problematic to ascribe to failed legislative efforts a dis-
tinctive public will to which the Court can be described as conform-
ing.  The elegance of Friedman’s writing may obscure a bit of the 
“chronology equals causality” assumption, and its attendant possibili-
ties of error, arguably at work in this seemingly seamless narrative. 
Friedman concludes that “[i]t is apparent time and again that 
what the Supreme Court responds to most often is the sustained voice 
of the people as expressed through the long process of contesting 
constitutional decisions.”24  But the “sustained voice” claim is in some 
tension with the more short term stories Friedman tells in the late 
1950s, or (with respect to the Equal Rights Amendment) in the 
1970s.  Moreover, the notion that the constitutional law we get is, 
generally speaking, what a majority wants, seems doubtful.  On many 
issues of constitutional law, contemporary majorities may have no 
will, as the issue has not risen to public notice except among a rela-
tively small group of those most affected—for example, the details of 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure law, or Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination law, or what counts as double jeopardy.  On other is-
sues, what the majority says it wants may, depending on the issue, be a 
product of how questions are phrased in public opinion polls.25  And 
in some cases a powerful social movement may have a momentum 
 
(2000) (discussing NAACP’s 1947 petition to the U.N. to protest and investigate racial 
discrimination in the United States). 
 23 My thanks to Mark Tushnet for the point about domains. 
 24 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 383. 
 25 George Gallup noted long ago that on some issues responses to public opinion polls were 
very sensitive to the wording used, while on other issues there was more stability of opi-
nion expressed.  See Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup:  Public Opinion and Consti-
tutional Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 94–95 (2002).  For more recent studies, 
see Graham Kalton et al., Experiments in Wording Opinion Questions, 27 APPLIED STAT. 149 
(1978).  Cf. Robert M. Groves, Research on Survey Data Quality, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. S156 
(1987); Jennifer Jerit, Issue Framing and Engagement; Rhetorical Strategy in Public Policy De-
bates, 30 POL. BEHAV. 1 (2008) (discussing impact of different rhetorical strategies on pub-
lic opinion). 
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behind it without clarity on what a “majority” supports.26  Maybe 
Friedman’s argument could be better understood as a claim that the 
Court’s rulings generally stay within what a majority of “the people” 
do not strongly and sustainably object to.  But this weakens the force 
of Friedman’s assertion that the Court’s decisions are “ratified” by the 
people;27 they may simply be acquiesced to because they are not 
strongly opposed by relevant pluralities. 
But does the historical narrative Friedman offers persuade the 
reader of the accuracy of Robert Dahl’s observation that the Court’s 
decisions will not stay out of line, for too long, from the preferences 
of those who hold power in the law-making branches of govern-
ment?28  Generally, yes.  Friedman contributes to a line of scholarship 
on the relationship of Supreme Court decisions on issues of public 
moment and public opinion, going back at least to James Bryce’s ob-
servation in 1891 that public “[o]pinion is stronger in America than 
anywhere else in the world, and judges are only men. . . . A court is 
sometimes so swayed consciously, more often unconsciously, because 
the pervasive sympathy of numbers is irresistible.”29  Does Friedman’s 
work cast light on the mechanisms by which this occurs?  The answer 
here is less clear. 
What are the mechanisms for the Court’s sensitivity to public opinion?  
Friedman’s work explores the interaction of a number of complex 
mechanisms,30 or means, by which the Court’s decisions stay more or 
 
 26 Friedman notes the importance of social movements in constructing public views.  There 
is no doubt that social movements are important in this way, but the success of a social 
movement in changing discourse, e.g., on the Second Amendment, or on campaign 
finance, does not tell us what “will of the people” is; majority views may be up for grabs 
for a long time.  Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Con-
stitutional Change:  The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1356 (2006) (dis-
cussing the “consent condition” for constitutional contestation while acknowledging that 
“because the consent condition does not guarantee speakers equality of resources or au-
thority, it can naturalize radically antidemocratic forms of subordination” and that in a 
“constitutional order . . . marked by social stratification or [unequal] opportunities for 
democratic voice . . . the consent condition . . . will reproduce and legitimate these condi-
tions”).  Social movements may expand the range of plausible interpretive choice without 
necessarily yielding a clear will of the people.  No doubt that the Court is over time res-
ponsive, but a stable equilibrium on particular decisions or issues may not occur as often 
as the book suggests. 
 27 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 381. 
 28 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 293 (1957) (observing that “the Supreme Court is inevitably a part 
of the dominant national alliance”). 
 29 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 267 (2d ed. 1891). 
 30 I am not using the word “mechanism” here in the technical sense of academic economics.  
Cf. Roger B. Myerson, Mechanism Design, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS ONLINE (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008), available 
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less in line with what “the people” are willing to accept.  Among the 
mechanisms his work touches on are the following:  1) appointments 
and the effects of changing membership; 2) sitting justices changing 
their views, whether consciously or unconsciously, under the persua-
sive influence of shifts in public or elite opinion; and 3) sitting justic-
es changing their views, again, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
under the influence of (a) more seemingly coercive forms of influ-
ence, including threats or action by the political branches manifestly 
designed to restrict, influence or constrain the Court’s decisions, or 
perhaps (b) the possibility of resistance or noncompliance that is an-
ticipated. 
As Friedman observes, his claim is that constitutional interpreta-
tion works to stay in rough balance with public opinion not so much 
because the Court is wise or discerning, but because the process of 
constitutional adjudication occurs over time, and through a regular 
process of decision, response, and, in cases of continuing controversy, 
repeated opportunities to re-decide similar issues as public views play 
out over time.31  The possibility of repeat litigation over similar issues, 
present in part because of the decentralized and common law struc-
tures in which the Supreme Court operates, in part because of the 
large and federal character of the nation, which sustains many differ-
ent governments, is an important aspect of the mechanisms Fried-
man has identified to account for the Court’s sensitivities to public 
opinion.  Yet the insight raises many questions, including the degree 
to which changes in membership—taking place over the time period 
of iterative litigation—are responsible for the Court’s shifts, or how 
often instead changes in judicial doctrine result from the conscious 
or unconscious reactions of judges to public opinion, political branch 
action, or feared resistance. 
A considerable literature has arisen to debate whether the Court 
votes “sincerely” in accord with the Justices’ own views, or “strategical-
ly” in light of (inter alia) the tolerances and expected reactions of the 
political branches.32  Each of these modalities might be thought to 
 
at http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_M000132 (describing a 
“mechanism” as a “specification of how economic decisions are determined as a function 
of the information that is known by the individuals in the economy,” and a “mathematical 
methodology for analyzing [sic] economic efficiency subject to incentive constraints,” en-
tailing both “incentive constraints” and “resource constraints”). 
 31 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 382–84. 
 32 See generally Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Supreme Court as a Strategic 
National Policymaker, 50 Emory L.J. 583 (2001) (describing the debate between “attitudi-
nalist” and “strategic voting” models, and arguing for a more strategic understanding of 
the voting behavior of Supreme Court justices). 
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correspond to different mechanisms for sustaining a relationship be-
tween public views and court decisions:  the appointment process, by 
which new Justices with sincere convictions different from the prevail-
ing jurisprudence may join the Court, and the interaction between 
political signals by external actors and the internal deliberative 
process by which Justices take account of the range of factors, includ-
ing prudential concerns about expected reactions. 
Friedman’s work offers tantalizing glimpses of each of these mod-
alities.  For example, Friedman suggests, shifts in Justices Frankfur-
ter’s and Harlan’s votes after the 1957 Communist Party cases appear 
likely to be (at least in part) a reaction to expressions of unhappiness 
with the Court from Congress, the ABA, or legal scholars;33 and, he 
also suggests, Stewart’s and White’s switch to support for state death 
penalty statutes after Furman v. Georgia34 is likely attributable to public 
views.35  But to establish that Justices Frankfurter and Harlan voted in-
sincerely might require more.  Judges, no less than other people, 
have a high capacity to convince themselves of the rightness or cor-
rectness of what is strategically advantageous; distinguishing con-
scious choice from unconscious influence is thus a challenge.36  On 
the death penalty cases, the accepted legal doctrine makes the per-
missibility of a punishment under the Eighth Amendment dependent 
on “evolving standards of decency,” including what is generally re-
 
 33 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 250–62. 
 34 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 35 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 285–88.  Since much of the uproar over the subversives cases 
built on Southern unhappiness with the Court over Brown, it is worth noting that three 
weeks after the Jenner-Butler jurisdiction stripping bill failed to pass, the Court issued its 
unanimous decision in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)—certainly not the move of a 
chastened body.  See Ross, supra note 19, at 508 (“Although the defeat of the Jenner-
Butler Bill three weeks before the Court decided Cooper may have emboldened the Court, 
many liberals preferred to argue that the narrowness with which the measure was de-
feated made Cooper ‘s uncompromising language all the more remarkable.”).  But cf. 
DUDZIAK, supra note 22, at 115–51 (situating Cooper in Cold War foreign affairs, as a de-
fense of Brown and thus a blow against Communism); Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold 
War Case, 91 J. AM. HIST. 32, 35 (2004) (describing how the press called Brown a “‘[b]low 
to [c]ommunism’”). 
 36 One might want to know more, from the Court’s internal records, about whether in the 
later cases these Justices acted inconsistently with their own earlier views.  For example, 
Professor Friedman lists, as among the post-1957 cases in which Justice Frankfurter voted 
with the government, Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 
9, at 515 n.178.  Yet according to The Supreme Court in Conference (1940–1985), at 300–07 
(Del Dickson, ed., 2001), excerpting from internal conference notes in Scales, initially 
heard in 1956, and then reargued more than once, Frankfurter indicated that the law 
under which Scales was initially prosecuted was “unwise” but not “unconstitutional”—on 
November 2, 1956, well before the 1957 release of decisions that led to the public reac-
tion Friedman describes.  Id. at 302. 
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garded as “cruel and unusual”37—state enactment of new death pe-
nalty laws after Furman may have gone to this criteria.  Although 
Friedman suggests that Justices White and Stewart could not have be-
lieved that the arbitrariness that troubled them in their opinions in 
Furman would be cured by the new statutes,38 the new statutes’ at-
tempts to regulate discretion, combined with changing societal indi-
cators of what is regarded as “cruel and unusual,” may have—within 
the domain of legal doctrine—played a role in their decisions. 
In the alternative modality, to the extent change in the direction 
of public opinion is also reflected in a change in personnel, such an 
account may jive entirely with a “sincere” voting account (albeit a di-
minished role for stare decisis).  The appointment process plainly 
played a significant role in many of the episodes Friedman talks 
about—including both Lawrence v. Texas39 (which overruled Bowers v. 
Hardwick)40 and the lead up to Boerne v. Flores.41  Even in the move 
from Furman to Gregg v. Georgia,42 the replacement of Justice Douglas 
with Justice John Paul Stevens (who voted with Stewart to uphold the 
Georgia statute in Gregg) may have resulted in a shift in the persuasive 
dynamic on the Court. 
Friedman’s book thus raises the question of the relative import of 
different mechanisms of the Court’s maintaining itself within what 
the public supports (or tolerates):  internal deliberations or the ex-
ternal influences created by the episodic appointment process.  In 
Lawrence, for example, the opinion for the Court was written by An-
thony Kennedy (who replaced Lewis Powell, who had voted the other 
 
 37 In Graham v. Florida, the Court stated: 
To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look 
beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society. . . . This is because the standard of extreme cruelty 
is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment.  The stan-
dard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores 
of society change. 
  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see infra note 63. 
 38 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 286–88. 
 39 539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 40 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia law criminalizing sodomy), overruled by Law-
rence, 539 U.S. 558. 
 41 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 898–99 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part); id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of depart-
ing from settled doctrine).  The Court that decided this case in 1990 included several 
members who were not on the Court when it had decided Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963), whose doctrine was generally displaced by Employment Division v. Smith.  See supra 
p. 413. 
 42 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (upholding a revised death penalty 
scheme allowing juries to impose the death penalty within certain prescribed guidelines). 
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way in Bowers); the majority also included Ruth Bader Ginsburg (who 
replaced Byron White, who had written the opinion for the Court in 
Bowers).  But how much of a role the appointment process plays as 
compared to shifts in view by an individual justice in response to pub-
lic opinion remains difficult to evaluate.43  Whatever may have moti-
vated Owen Roberts in the so-called “switch in time that saved nine,” 
the New Deal understanding of federal power under the Commerce 
Clause could not have been consolidated and extended as it was in 
the absence of the several retirements and replacements that oc-
curred between 1937 and the decision in Wickard v. Filburn.44 
II.  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC OPINION AND INTERPRETATION 
Friedman puts a great question in his book, concerning the “ca-
pacity the justices have to act independently of the public’s views”:  In 
other words, he asks, do the justices have sufficient capacity for truly 
independent judgment?45  As he suggests, this is at least as important 
a question as whether the Court is “too” countermajoritarian.  These 
questions go to the core of the dilemma of the role of a constitutional 
court in a democracy.  In some cases constitution framers, in mo-
ments of insight, altruism or long term understanding of self interest, 
might want to have courts that can make decisions independently of 
majoritarian sentiment, even if it is to some extent enduring; think of 
the multi-year national episodes of xenophobia, such as the period of 
the Palmer Raids after World War I, or of the internment of Japanese-
American citizens, upheld in Korematsu v. United States,46 during World 
War II.  In other cases, constitutional designers might want courts to 
be open to popular influence in understanding changing economies, 
changing technologies, or problems relevant to the scope of govern-
 
 43 When the Court apparently changes direction without explicit overruling, there will often 
be disagreement on whether or not the factors claimed to account for the shift are “legal-
ly relevant.”  Even when prior cases are overruled, there will be disagreement over wheth-
er the prior decisions should be regarded as correct statements of the law.  In order to be 
able to account for a change, one must consider the possibility that “legal” as well as “atti-
tudinal” or “strategic” factors play a role, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 748 (2000) 
(explaining that judges look to current understandings of the law under the “legal” mod-
el, whereas under the “attitudinal” model they simply follow their own ideological prefe-
rences), and it may be difficult to get sufficient agreement on what are the legally rele-
vant factors to reliably (in a statistical sense) test other hypotheses. 
 44 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER:  FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE 
SUPREME COURT 519–29 (2010). 
 45 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 373. 
 46 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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ment power to address contemporary problems.  Of course, a difficul-
ty is that the people might well disagree about what kinds of cases fall 
into which categories; debt relief legislation might be viewed by credi-
tors as an attack on vested and important individual rights, and by 
debtors as a necessary governmental response to urgent conditions.47 
The idea that one would want courts to be independent of majori-
tarian sentiment might simply reflect an aspiration to impartiality in 
the decision of particular cases;48 whatever the legal rule is, the court 
should apply it without regard to the popularity or likeability of the 
plaintiff or defendant.  But in a constitutional democracy, the court’s 
independence is intended also to serve the important function of 
providing an impartial tribunal to stand between peoples and gov-
ernments, to act as a check on the abuse of government power—
which requires a special form of impartiality, given that judges are 
generally paid by their governments.  In this sense, one might see the 
aspiration for independence of the courts as reflecting a commitment 
to the importance of constitutional principle. 
Friedman makes the intriguing suggestion that the Court is inde-
pendent because the public wants it to be, because the public 
“grants” that independence to the Court.49  “[D]iffuse support is the 
measure of the slack the Court has to go its own way on some is-
sues. . . . Perhaps nobody really wants a Supreme Court that simply 
panders to majority opinion.  Maybe people figure that [they could 
be a minority some day].”50  On this formulation, the Court’s inde-
pendence depends on the presence of a competitive system in which 
current power holders may become losers; if a very stable majority be-
lieves it will always be a majority it will want a subordinate Court. 
But while Friedman may be right about the preconditions for pub-
lic support for judicial independence, this does not necessarily ex-
haust the reasons to value judicial independence—reasons that go 
beyond the positive account grounded in a competitive political envi-
ronment.  Friedman argues that judicial review is normatively valua-
 
 47 Compare Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding state  
debtor relief legislation claimed to impair mortgage contracts in violation of the Consti-
tution in light of the nature of current emergency), with id. at 448–49 (Sutherland, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the Constitution’s meaning does not change and that the legisla-
tion impairs the validity of contracts). 
 48 Cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, Declarations of Independence:  Judicial Reactions to Political Pressure, 
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS:  AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 227, 
230–31 (Stephen Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (developing the distinction be-
tween impartiality as to cases and impartiality as to correct rule). 
 49 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 379. 
 50 Id. 
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ble because:  (a) it acts as a prod to public deliberation over impor-
tant questions, through a dialogic process, notably including judicial 
“stickiness”; and (b) thereby, over the long run, assists in developing 
the Constitution’s meaning in accord with the enduring or long-term 
will of the people.51  To the extent that this is a claim about the neces-
sity of connecting judicial discourse about the Constitution with the 
developing views of the democratic people, it would find considera-
ble support not only in the U.S. literature but also in Europe.52  In a 
recent book, for example, a European constitutionalist, Victor Fer-
reres Comella, agrees with Friedman on the importance of dialogue.  
Ferreres Comella argues for both the accessibility of constitutional 
court decisions to the people and of their gaining the attention of the 
people.  He insists that constitutional values are, in important part, 
the moral consensus of a community, so courts are interpreting and 
implementing principles which are themselves rooted in the deci-
sions of the people.  And he is in agreement on the importance of 
democratic responses—amendment, appointment, interpretive ad-
justment—to the legitimacy of judicial review.53 
But for Ferreres Comella, these are not necessarily the primary or 
only justifications for judicial review; a second set of justifications, 
important in both the U.S. and Europe, are quite different.  Like 
Dworkin, Eisgruber, Fiss, and Sager,54 Ferreres Comella sees courts as 
forums of principle or impartiality, and sees judges as more likely to 
get right answers to questions of constitutional principle than legisla-
tures.  Ferreres Comella makes this argument, suggesting that courts 
have the time, the mandate, and institutional interest to focus on 
constitutional values, and a greater capacity for ethical and principled 
decision making than do legislatures or executives.55  Such arguments 
about courts are, in my view, ultimately premised on the belief that 
 
 51 Id. at 382-84. 
 52 See, e.g., VICTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES:  
A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE (2009). 
 53 See id. at 96–107. 
 54 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, at viii (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 2 (1985); CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3 
(2001); LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES:  A THEORY OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 199–201 (2004); see also Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Ex-
clusivity, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 187, 203 (2007) (explaining the Court’s “special compe-
tence to arrive at a correct interpretation” of the Constitution, derived from limitations 
on judicial power “that commit the judiciary to what might be called public reason,” in-
cluding an obligation to hear both sides of disputes it will resolve); Lawrence G. Sager, 
Courting Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1370–71 (2005) (emphasizing courts’ greater 
capacity for impartiality and their “epistemic discipline of coherence”). 
 55 See FERRERES COMELLA, supra note 52, at 32–34. 
Dec. 2010] DEMOCRACY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 427 
 
there are right answers, or better answers, or (at least) less wrong an-
swers, to questions arising under constitutional principles.  These 
right answers (or less wrong answers) exist, to at least some extent, 
apart from the vagaries of public opinion.  Courts are there, in part, 
to help provide right answers to questions of constitutional values, 
which overlap with questions of political morality.56 
This idea of the possibility of right answers as a matter of constitu-
tional principle could be reframed as one about the need to avoid 
clearly wrong answers on matters of constitutional principle.  Despite 
faith in democratic processes, it is hard to sustain the view that demo-
cratic processes do not at times reach quite stable but wrong answers 
in terms of constitutional principle and morality.57  And it is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that one of the normative functions of indepen-
dent courts is to try to resist the dramatically wrong answers at which 
democratic polities sometimes arrive. 
The possibility of identifiably wrong constitutional answers leads 
me to my final comments, designed to supplement Friedman’s argu-
ment towards a theory of legitimate constitutional interpretation.  
Friedman’s argument in this book depends on the stickiness and 
slowness of the Court’s procedures and process of change,58 together 
with the dialogue that they can create, that, for him, constitute the 
uniquely self-legitimating features of judicial review in the American 
democracy.  It is, ultimately, a democratic grounding—albeit a form 
of more deliberative democracy. 
 
 56 For arguments for why courts can do this better than legislatures, see id., noting the judi-
ciary’s political insulation, unique function, and reasoned decision-making processes.  But 
see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 230–32 (2006); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 2 
(1999); Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1508 (2007) (“[L]egislators plausibly have better information than 
judges about the factual components and causal consequences of their constitutional de-
cisions.”); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 
1379–80 (2006) (emphasizing moral capacities of legislators); cf. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING 
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, at x (1999) (emphasizing the harms of judi-
cial review). 
 57 Friedman at one point says that “everything important happens” after decisions—maybe 
so with respect to “alignment with popular opinion,” FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 382–83, 
but surely not “everything important.”  Surely some important things happen at the time 
of the judgment.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (affirming 
the government’s exclusion of citizens of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast and the 
criminal conviction of the petitioner for defying the exclusion orders). 
 58 Cf. Ward Farnsworth, The Regulation of Turnover on the Supreme Court, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
407, 414 (discussing benefits of the “slower law” that emerges from courts and opposing 
change in tenure of Supreme Court justices). 
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A constitution typically must find justification in both democratic 
consent or accountability and in good or just principles.  To attract 
adherence as a special form of law, constitutions often are associated 
with assertions of general, admirable, and (even) universalizable 
principles.  True, one could conceive of a constitution as solely an 
operating system for governance, defining the election units and pe-
riods and allocating powers to government entities; and there are ef-
fective constitutions in the world that lean heavily towards the operat-
ing rules version with relatively small efforts to constrain democratic 
decision making through articulated “rights,” as in Australia.  But if 
not seen as embodying implicit commitments to good and just prin-
ciples, beyond majority rule, it may be difficult—in a working and 
pluralistic democracy—for such a constitution to sustain itself over 
time.  Interpretive questions will arise even about the simple operat-
ing rules; without resort to more general principles that can attract 
wide agreement to resolve these questions, the stability of the system 
will be threatened.  So, constitutions, to be successful in acting as a 
fundamental law that normatively constrains government actors, must 
include (at least implicitly) some commitments to “principles” 
beyond simply the operating rules of a particular governance system. 
What this means, I think, is that, at least on some issues and at 
some levels, some degree of countermajoritarian “difficulty” cannot 
be entirely dissolved by ongoing democratic dialogue and accounta-
bility.  Even if one might argue that in a thin, operating system kind 
of constitution the only “value” is that of democracy, issues will arise 
that challenge the more general values implicit in this, whether those 
be of human equality, or of protection of minority interests through 
election units or other means.59  There is thus a continuing tension 
between democracy (whether understood simply as majority rule or 
as any other operating rule) and principle; in that tension and its on-
going working out lies the promise, and challenge, of constitutional-
ism. 
Democratic accountability, participation, and dialogue are neces-
sary, then, but not sufficient, to legitimate a constitution and its en-
 
 59 To the extent interpretive questions arise, an effort to interpret a constitutional provision 
in light of such a value may entail the possibility of conflict between what is claimed to be 
a narrow or “literal” application of the constitutional provision as a “rule,” or an alterna-
tive reading based on a different or deeper understanding of the relevant constitutional 
value (including democracy).  Moreover, democracy as a value may be indeterminate on 
some issues:  In a federal system, for example, issues about the allocation of powers rou-
tinely can be seen to pit sub-national majorities against national majorities, in a setting in 
which the principle of democracy by itself does not provide guidance on which majority 
should control. 
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forcement mechanisms of judicial review.  Friedman suggests that dif-
fuse support for courts corresponds to the amount of “slack” courts 
have.60  Let me suggest that what political scientists call “diffuse” sup-
port61 might correspond to something else that we could call a com-
mitment to being governed by principles, including the principle of 
independent courts to apply those principles.  So my first claim here 
is that constitutionalism—and constitutions that aim to create or sus-
tain the conditions of constitutionalism—must rest on sufficiently 
good principles in addition to those of democracy and consent. 
I turn now to a second set of normative questions, concerning the 
implications of Friedman’s book for the practice of interpretation.  I 
worry that this brilliant book may be misused to argue either that  1) 
the “will of the people” ought to be viewed as controlling constitu-
tional meaning in some narrow, time-limited sense; and/or 2) that it 
is only American views and experience that matter in interpreting the 
U.S. Constitution.  Should the Court now treat public opinion as an 
independent source, like text, or original understandings, that 
should be considered as such in deciding constitutional cases?  
Should it exclude everything that is not “American” experience and 
opinion from its ongoing evaluation of constitutional meaning? 
As I said at the outset, this book ought to be understood to ex-
clude interpretive moves, such as that in Boerne, that seek essentially 
to ignore the constitutional views of the public or its legislature.  One 
can even remain a “judicial supremacist” without thinking it sensible 
to exclude from efforts to best understand constitutional meaning 
the views of the Congress.  But at the same time, the adjudicative 
process would not be improved if the Court were to treat public opi-
nion as a new, independent interpretive source, for at least three rea-
sons. 
First, the effect of public opinion is both pervasive and subtle; to 
explicitly treat it as a separate factor would entail some double-
 
 60 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 379. 
 61 Diffuse support is often distinguished from specific support.  See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY 
ET AL., PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS:  ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
10 (1973) (defining “diffuse support” as a generalized attachment, while specific support 
“refer[s] to the critical or favorable reactions to what the Court or individual justices have 
recently done”); see also James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme Court and the US Presidential 
Election of 2000:  Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 537 (2003) 
(explaining “diffuse support” as equivalent to “legitimacy,” a form of “institutional loyalty” 
not dependent on the “immediate outputs” of the Court); cf. Gregory A. Caldeira & 
James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 
635–37 (1992) (distinguishing diffuse support among the general public, which is in 
practice unrelated to specific outputs, and diffuse support among opinion leaders, whose 
support for the Court is linked to more specific policy preferences). 
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counting.  As Bryce’s quotation above suggests, its most important 
impacts may be subconscious.  Second, taken as a source like “text” or 
“precedent,” a “public opinion” factor is likely to give too much effect 
to views that may not be enduringly reflective of considered public 
will.  That is, it may reflect temporary preferences of those in power 
or those who are polled.  Third, doing so has the potential to make 
more difficult the task of treating the Constitution as a principled in-
strument, designed to embody claims to justice and fairness that in-
spire and deserve respect as fundamental law. 
Although I agree with Friedman that to view constitutional law as 
entirely separate from politics is both unrealistic and normatively un-
desirable, since the constitutional values being enforced must be 
connected to the polity, at the same time what the Court does should 
be, and should be seen to be, about law.  Law is connected to legal 
texts, to past precedents, to past, as well as present, understandings.  
Given my reading of Friedman’s position, which places much more 
weight on large-scale shifts in views and understandings over time 
than on the year-to-year or even decade-to-decade shifts in popular 
attention, conventional tools of analysis should continue to drive in-
terpretive analyses of the Court.  These conventional tools include 
text, precedent, original understandings, history, structure and pur-
pose, values, and consequences.62 
No new theory of constitutional interpretation is required to take 
account of the insights of this book.  Conventional sources—
including legal understandings of the purpose of constitutional pro-
visions, and of constitutional values, as well as of the consequences of 
different interpretations—can at times be meaningfully informed by 
understanding what the democratic polity thinks and how it will 
react.  This does not mean that “prudential” considerations ought to 
drive constitutional interpretation, but that in understanding the 
consequences of a decision it is important to take into account the 
reactions of public officials and the public as a whole, over time.  The 
Constitution is about creating a working government, and a govern-
ment charter enforced without regard to consequences is not likely to 
survive long.  In some areas, the doctrine itself permits the principled 
consideration of large-scale and enduring public views (as in the 
 
 62 See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:  THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); 
Vicki C. Jackson, Multi-Valenced Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Comparisons:  
An Essay in Honor of Mark Tushnet, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 599 (2008); David A. Strauss, 
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
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Eighth Amendment’s doctrinal attention to “evolving standards of 
decency”).63  In other areas, public views may have much less of a legi-
timate role to play (consider the protection of unpopular minority 
religions). 
Turning to the role of foreign law or experience, conventional in-
terpretive analysis of the Constitution has long included—and increa-
singly will and should include—awareness of comparisons with other 
countries, comparisons that may assist in the clarification of what U.S. 
constitutional values are (whether similar or different) and that may 
cast light on the consequences of different interpretive choices.64  
Friedman’s book contributes to our understanding of how percep-
tions of the international context have long influenced domestic con-
stitutional understandings.65  He argues that in the crisis of 1937, 
F.D.R.’s Court-packing plan fell on a country at a time of increased 
concern about totalitarianism, a concern arising out of awareness of 
events in Europe; he notes members of Congress accusing Roosevelt 
of seeking the powers of a Hitler or Mussolini in trying to weaken the 
Court’s role as a bulwark of liberty.66  The international context af-
forded a comparative mirror through which to evaluate the implica-
tions of Roosevelt’s proposal, in light of the U.S. commitment to the 
principles of judicial independence and liberty. 
Today, there are more relevant comparative law materials that are 
more accessible than they were in the 1930s, and it is increasingly im-
portant that the constitutional democracies of the world be aware of 
the constitutional experience of other countries.  The United States 
government sometimes acts as though the people of the United 
States as a country have a stake in the internal constitutional deci-
sions of other countries, recently demonstrated, for example, with re-
spect to Honduras.67  And other countries sometimes behave as 
 
 63 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion))). 
 64 See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 103–59 
(2010); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976–77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(describing how other countries’ “experience may . . . cast an empirical light on the con-
sequences of different solutions to a common legal problem” and arguing that European 
federalisms do not support the anti-commandeering rule adopted by majority); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”:  The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication,  Address to the International 
Academy of Comparative Law (July 30, 2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_08-02-10.html. 
 65 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 218–20. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See, e.g., Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by President Ob-
ama and President Uribe of Colombia in Joint Press Availability (June 29, 2009), available 
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though they have a stake in our constitutional rulings, even when 
their own nationals are not involved, as in filings by the E.U. in U.S. 
death penalty cases.68  As the world in which we live becomes more 
permeable and more mobile, the constitutional democracies of the 
world do have stakes in the success of others in sustaining democratic 
constitutionalism, and in the decisions of courts—and legislatures—
that contribute to that goal.69 
 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-President-Obama-and-
President-Uribe-of-Colombia-in-Joint-Press-Availability/ (remarks by President Obama) 
(referring to the coup in Honduras and stating that the “coup was not legal and that Pres-
ident Zelaya remains the President of Honduras”); Editorial, A Way Out in Honduras, L.A. 
TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A18 (reporting that President Obama called the recent actions of 
the Honduras government illegal and paused U.S. aid to that country).  Honduras’ ac-
tions were, at least in part, arguably in conformity with a decision of its own Supreme 
Court, however, and the question of their constitutionality under the Honduras constitu-
tion has been hotly debated.  Compare Doug Cassel, Honduras:  Coup d’Etat in Constitu-
tional Clothing?, ASIL INSIGHT, July 29, 2009, available at http://www.asil.org/
files/insight090729pdf.pdf (arguing that the action of the Congress in removing Zelaya 
from office was plainly unlawful) with Frank M. Walsh, The Honduran Constitution Is Not a 
Suicide Pact:  The Legality of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya’s Removal, 38 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 339, 364–66 (2010) (arguing that because a prior amendment had inadvertently 
removed provisions for an impeachment procedure, the actions of the Congress were in 
accord with the spirit of the Constitution, given the threat the President posed to the 
constitutional order and the rule of law by his defiance of court orders and efforts to cir-
cumvent unamendable provisions of the Constitution). 
 68 See Brief for the European Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McCarver v. 
North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), cited in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 316 n.21 (2002).  In its Statement of Interest, the EU wrote:   
Like the United States, the European Union (“EU”) is founded on principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law.  These principles are common to its fifteen member states:  Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
  Id. at 1.  The brief continued: 
The EU and its member states are opposed to the death penalty in all cases and 
accordingly aim at its universal abolition.  The abolition of the death penalty con-
tributes to the enhancement of human dignity and the progressive development 
of human rights.  This view has been expressed to the government of the United 
States through various general demarches and through specific demarches in cas-
es involving, inter alia, the pending execution of persons with mental retardation.  
The EU and its member states pursue this policy consistently in different interna-
tional fora such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe, as well as 
through bilateral contacts with many countries that retain the death penal-
ty. . . . The EU provides a special and unique perspective to this Court that is not 
available through the views of the parties or other amici. 
  Id. at 1–2 (citing Guidelines to EU Policy Towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty, EUR. 
UNION (June 3, 1998) available at www.eurunion.org/legilat/DeathPenalty/
Guidelines.htm). 
 69 See JACKSON, supra note 64, at 120, 130–31 (noting the interdependent relationships of 
nations to one another in international law and in sustaining democratic constitutional-
ism). 
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Both the “will of the people” and the judgments of the Court on 
the important values of the Constitution are inevitably influenced, 
positively and negatively, by our understandings of the practices and 
views of other nations—both those we regard as examples of what we 
do not want to be and those we regard as similarly committed to the 
ideals of liberal constitutional democracy.  Friedman’s book illu-
strates this international context in the 1930s, and, as I and others 
have described, it is a factor throughout American constitutional his-
tory.70  But, like “public opinion,” foreign law and experience are not 
necessarily “independent” factors or sources of law but rather may 
help judges—and the American public—decide what they believe are 
the consequences of alternative interpretations, or what controlling 
U.S. constitutional values are on a matter, or on the utility of differ-
ent doctrinal approaches to similar problems. 
In contrast to the Court’s defensive assertions of legal autonomy—
from the U.S. Congress (and the public it represents) and from for-
eign experience—in the late 1990s, Friedman’s book may be taken as 
an eloquent proof that the Court should not fear, but embrace, 
knowledge and understanding of the contemporary world. 
III.  AMENDOPHOBIA, ARTICLE V AND THE “WILL OF THE PEOPLE” 
One of the particularly noteworthy claims in this book is Fried-
man’s argument that in 1937, “we the people” agreed that the Consti-
tution could be amended through interpretation, rather than having 
to resort to the Article V process:  “The true significance of 
1937 . . . was plain for all to see.  The American people signaled their 
acceptance of judicial review as the proper way to alter the meaning 
of the Constitution, but only so long as the justices’ decisions re-
mained within the mainstream of poplar understanding.”71  Fried-
man’s claim about the meaning of the events of 1937, including 
whether they marked a departure from prior periods, could be con-
tested,72 but he is undoubtedly correct that these events manifested a 
 
 70 See e.g., id. at 103–14; Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court 
and Foreign Sources of Law:  Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Deci-
sion, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 
31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2006). 
 71 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 196. 
 72 To note just a couple of questions about Friedman’s claim:  The force of Friedman’s 
claim depends in part on whether the 1937 cases represented an “alter[ation]” or 
amendment to the Constitution, that is, what was being changed was “the Constitution” 
rather than the Court’s erroneous interpretations of the Constitution.  The suggestion 
that whenever the Court overrules its own earlier decisions the Constitution has been 
amended depends on a contestable merger of the jurisprudence with the Constitution it-
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significant public tolerance of change in doctrine by the Supreme 
Court. 
But one of the remarkable features of the history to which Fried-
man draws attention is the undoubtedly diminished role of formal 
amendment in the constitutional conversation of that time and in 
many of the decades since.  The near invisibility of the amendment 
process in Friedman’s book—the relatively slight attention given, for 
example, to the Nineteenth Amendment, the Civil War Amendments, 
or to the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments—is perhaps un-
derstandable because, as Friedman shows, interpretation has played 
so important a role in the process of constitutional change and ad-
justment and because his book is, after all, focused on the Supreme 
Court and public opinion.  Indeed, Friedman’s book may be read as a 
powerful account of how, as a historical matter, interpretation has 
come to supplant amendment as the method of choice for constitu-
tional contest and change:  the apparent responsiveness of the Court 
to elected officials and public views may have persuaded many that 
formal amendment is not necessary. 
The history told here thus may reinforce a normative disposition 
to oppose or discount the possibility of amendments of the Constitu-
tion even when considerable numbers of the people believe an im-
portant change is required.  Take, for example, Citizens United.73  In 
that case the Court, 5-4, overruled two earlier decisions to hold that 
Congress lacked power to prohibit or limit the independent expendi-
tures of corporations made on behalf of political candidates.  The two 
decisions overruled were Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,74 de-
cided in 1990, and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,75 decided 
 
self.  Moreover, in the period after 1937, resort to the amendment process remained an 
apparent possibility both in actions in the Congress (some of which led to Amendments 
XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, and XXVI), and in efforts by state courts and legislatures to 
procure amendments in response to Warren Court decisions in the 1950s and 1960s.  See 
generally Ross, supra note 16, at 484, 528–52 (describing three proposed amendments 
sponsored by states’ rights proponents).  The failure of the Court-packing plan, further-
more, has been explained by some as being in part a rejection of Roosevelt’s perceived 
high-handedness or as reflecting fear of an American dictatorship, rather than Court ve-
neration or an embrace of a particular role of the Court.  See JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME 
POWER:  FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 503 (2010). 
 73 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 74 494 U.S. 652, 666, 668 (1990) (upholding section 54(1) of the Michigan Campaign 
Finance Act, which restricts corporations from using general treasury funds for indepen-
dent expenditures in connection with state candidate elections, against First Amendment 
and Equal Protection Clause challenges). 
 75 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003) (upholding section 203 of The Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (BRCA) and its extension of restrictions on corporate independent expendi-
tures in connection with federal elections to include all “electioneering contributions”). 
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only seven years earlier in 2003.  The Citizens United decision has oc-
casioned considerable controversy, and public opinion polling sug-
gests that between 60% and 80% of voters disapproved the decision 
and favored limits on campaign expenditures by corporate entities.76  
One might have thought that with this level of disapproval, on a re-
cent decision that overruled previously settled law, a constitutional 
amendment would at least be considered as a response.  Although 
some members of Congress have sponsored or proposed constitu-
tional amendments,77 the weight of the effort by those who disagree 
with the decision has been in other directions.78  Although some 
NGOs have raised amendment as a possible avenue to explore,79 oth-
 
 76 See Monica Youn, Citizens United:  The Aftermath, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, 1–2 (June 2010), 
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/C21/Issue%20Briefs/ACS%20Issue%20Brief%20-%20Youn
%20Citizens%20United.pdf (describing results of polls by Washington Post-ABC News, 
Pew, Common Cause, and People for the American Way, taken a month or so after the 
Court’s decision).  Of the two polls that broke down responses by political affiliation, a 
clear majority of both Democrats and Republicans opposed the decision, with opposition 
highest among those who describe themselves as independents.  See id.  A poll by People 
for the American Way found “78% believed that corporations should be limited in how 
much they can spend to influence elections, and 70% believed corporations already have 
too much influence over elections.”  Id. at 1. 
 77 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 74, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing a constitutional amendment per-
mitting Congress and the States to regulate “expenditure of funds by corporations engag-
ing in political speech,” introduced by Congresswoman Donna Edwards of Maryland, with 
twenty-five cosponsors); Press Release, Senator Max Baucus, Baucus Statement on Cam-
paign Finance Ruling (Oct. 18, 2010), available at  http://baucus.senate.gov/
?p=press_release&id=222 (describing Senator Baucus’ proposed constitutional amend-
ment to authorize regulation of corporate and union campaign contributions and ex-
penditures).  For an earlier proposal by Senator Charles Schumer, with bipartisan co-
sponsorship, see S.J. Res. 21, 110th Cong. (2007), proposing a constitutional amendment 
authorizing Congress and the States to “regulate the raising and spending of money, in-
cluding through setting limits” for elections and, in the case of states, referenda, initia-
tives and similar ballot measures. 
 78 See e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act 
(DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); Democracy is Strengthened by Casting 
Light on Spending in Elections Act (DISCLOSE Act), S. 3295, 111th Cong. (2010); 
Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. (2010); Fair Elections Now 
Act, H.R. 1826, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Citizens United:  Waking 
a Sleeping Giant, BUS. ETHICS, (Oct. 21, 2010), http://business-ethics.com/2010/
10/21/1304-citizens-united-waking-a-sleeping-giant.  But cf. PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY, 
http://www.pfaw.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2010) (urging support for the “DISCLOSE” 
Act, a proposed statute to require disclosure of corporate campaign spending, while also 
urging support for a constitutional amendment).  For proposals for a new constitutional 
convention, see CALL CONVENTION, http://www.callaconvention.org/ (last visited Nov. 
14, 2010) (promoting a constitutional convention from which legislators are excluded 
and referring specifically to the need for campaign finance reform). 
 79 See, e.g., FREE SPEECH FOR PEOPLE, www.freespeechforpeople.org (last visited Nov. 14, 
2010) (advocating a constitutional amendment in response to Citizens United); PLEDGE TO 
PROTECT AM.’S DEMOCRACY, http://www.pledgefordemocracy.org (last visited Nov. 14, 
2010) (website established by People for the American Way and Public Citizen) (seeking 
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ers seem to avoid it conspicuously.  For example, a recent paper, writ-
ten by a senior counsel for campaign finance to the Brennan Center’s 
Democracy Project, explains why the decision is an incorrect reading 
of the First Amendment and what the adverse consequences of the 
decision could be for the quality of American democracy.  It recom-
mends a three-fold strategy to overcome its effects:  a focus on new 
interpretive approaches, a focus on various forms of new legislation 
(including public campaign finance), and work on judicial appoint-
ments.80  Nowhere in this thoughtful paper, however, is the possibility 
of constitutional amendment even broached. 
This kind of silence about amendment is symptomatic of what I 
would term a fear of constitutional amendments, an “amendophobi-
a,” especially on the left.  Fifteen years ago, after the Republican vic-
tories in the midterm 1994 elections led to a spate of proposed con-
stitutional amendments being introduced or considered in the 
Congress, Kathleen Sullivan wrote a paper about what she called 
“amendmentitis”—a propensity, as she described it, to rush to consti-
tutional amendment to solve problems that could be addressed legis-
latively or (worse) should not be addressed by law, and especially not 
entrenched law.81  She identified five reasons to operate on a pre-
sumption against amending the constitution:  constitutional stability, 
the rule of law, constitutional coherence, the benefits of constitution-
al generality, and preserving the role of the Supreme Court.82  Many 
 
pledges to support a constitutional amendment to overturn holdings that corporations 
have the same First Amendment rights as citizens). 
 80 See Youn, supra note 76, at 9–18 (emphasizing need to build legal records to meet “com-
pelling interest” test, to develop interpretive approaches focused on voters, and to enact 
new legislation to provide disclosure and advance public financing); id. at 20 (emphasiz-
ing importance of new judges with conception of the First Amendment different from 
that of the Roberts Court majority). 
 81 See supra note 10; see also Frank Michelman, Saving Old Glory:  On Constitutional Iconography, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1354-59 (1990). 
 82 See generally Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, supra note 10.  Sullivan’s points about 
stability seem spot on:  If a constitution is to serve as a basic framework for an ongoing le-
gal system, and especially if it is to serve as an object of affection and loyalty, it must be 
seen as an enduring document.  But while the rule of law might be threatened by too 
many changes in law too fast, it is not clear why the rule of law is less threatened by 
change through litigation and interpretation than by change through formal amend-
ment; indeed, since Article V specifies in writing the amendment procedure, one might 
think that, along traditional rule of law conceptions, change by amendment would be 
preferred. 
   Sullivan’s argument from coherence—that the Constitution was conceived as a 
whole, such that changes in one part may affect others—raises a good caution, but overall 
seems less persuasive as a reason not to amend.  First, it may be based on an overstate-
ment of the degree of coherence in the original document.  See Mark Tushnet, The Possi-
bilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1285–306 (1999) (discussing 
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of the arguments have considerable force:  Very frequent amendment 
of a constitution may detract from its overall stability and the habits 
of the rule of law (which are closely related to the interests in stabili-
ty), and could undermine the Supreme Court’s role in protecting in-
dividual rights and liberties. 
Too frequent amendment (or too many highly specific amend-
ments) might also diminish the force of the Constitution itself as a 
“symbol” of the nation and its commitments to constitutional democ-
racy, as argued by a bipartisan group put together by the Constitution 
Project and the Twentieth Century Fund to establish proposed guide-
lines for the kinds of issues that should be dealt with by amendment, 
rather than by legislation.83  This bipartisan committee took the view 
that, because constitutional amendments bind future generations, 
which generally should be able to re-examine contested policies in 
light of future experience, restraint is appropriate; the Prohibition 
Amendment is in their view a paradigm of an imprudent and inap-
propriate amendment.84  On campaign finance, however, one might 
 
“bricolage” in constitution-drafting and its implications for coherence-based interpretive 
approaches).  Second, it ignores the effects of intervening amendments that changed 
prior structures or relationships in dramatic ways.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. 
CONST. amend. XVII.  Professor Sullivan’s argument on coherence grounds against a ba-
lanced budget amendment seemed particularly subject to question, since Congress’s 
modern authority to tax arguably derives in important part from the Sixteenth Amend-
ment, adopted long after the original Constitution. 
   Embedded within Sullivan’s argument on coherence is a different one, particularly 
concerned with the Bill of Rights.  Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy, supra note 10, at 
699-700.  Is it particularly important not to encourage amendments to the Bill of Rights?  
This argument gives one real pause.  To the extent that a bill of rights is intended to pro-
tect those who are unpopular, there is good reason to make their amendment difficult.  
Cf. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74(2) (establishing a somewhat more rigorous procedure to 
amend the Bill of Rights chapter than for some other kinds of amendment).  But even if 
this argument provides a good reason for a presumption against amending the Bill of 
Rights in response to Court decisions, it surely does not support an absolute bar. 
   Sullivan is also right, I think, that if the Constitution is too easily or often amended, 
the role of the Court in protecting its values accordingly diminishes.  However, Sullivan’s 
objections generally do not help discriminate between amendments that ought to be pur-
sued and those that should not.  They can be understood to support an important pre-
cautionary principle that the effects of an amendment across the Constitution must be 
considered before an amending process is undertaken. 
 83 See CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, “GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS”:  
DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 4–5 (1999) (arguing that amend-
ing the Constitution too often or with “the detailed specificity of an ordinary statute” 
would decrease the document’s symbolic importance); cf. Michelman, supra note 81, at 
1362-64 (advancing the “idea that the Constitution is in some sense a picture of ‘us’”). 
 84 See CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83, at 3–4.  Their report also suggests that 
a proposed campaign finance amendment of the 1990s should be seen merely as a “re-
sponse to contemporary political pressures” and not about an “enduring” problem.  Id. at 
11.  Yet two generations have come of age between 1976, when Buckley was decided, and 
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look at the Court’s decisions since Buckley v. Valeo,85 in 1976, as “bind-
ing future” generations to a highly contested understanding of con-
stitutional meaning on a point of real moment.  The Prohibition 
Amendment, moreover, established a directive rule on an issue of so-
cial policy, prohibiting the manufacture or distribution of intoxicat-
ing beverages; an amendment that overcomes a Court decision in or-
der to empower (but not require) governments to regulate 
electioneering by corporations would not prohibit or mandate a par-
ticular course of action.86 
The idea that amendment should not be the first response to a 
decision with which one disagrees seems quite sound, especially in a 
complex democracy with a deeply entrenched constitution.  Howev-
er, the fact that very frequent amendments will have negative conse-
quences does not address the question of whether an occasional 
amendment will have such consequences.  And the terms of amend-
ing the U.S. Constitution are so difficult that—at least if history is a 
good predictor—there may be greater risks of too infrequent, than of 
too frequent, amendment.  To suggest that too much or too easy 
amendment is a bad thing does not imply that the Constitution 
should never be amended nor even give that much guidance on 
when it should and should not be.  Politically eschewing amendment 
may cede an important democratic tool, manifesting a fear of the 
people and of democratic self-government that in the long run may 
 
2010, when Citizens United was, and the problems of expense and influence in campaign 
spending have certainly not diminished in that time.  Rounds of congressional legisla-
tion—no easy matter to achieve—involving efforts to regulate campaign spending have 
been repeatedly rebuffed by the Court on constitutional grounds.  Whether statutory 
means have been exhausted is not clear, but the efficacy of alternative forms of regulation 
that would survive constitutional scrutiny under prevailing standards is also unclear. 
 85 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down campaign expenditure limits of the Feder-
al Elections Campaign Act of 1971 [FECA]); see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding restrictions on independent corporate treasury expendi-
tures unconstitutional); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 
456 (2007) (holding electioneering limits of McCain-Feingold law unconstitutional as 
applied to speech other than “express advocacy”); Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Mass. Citi-
zens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding provisions of the FECA unconstitutional 
as applied to nonprofit advocacy group’s speech). 
 86 Cf. CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83, at 12–13 (distinguishing between 
power granting amendments “necessary . . . [to] eliminate constitutional barriers” to leg-
islation and amendments that “restrict the scope of democratic participation by future 
generations”).  On this account, an amendment authorizing regulation may be seen in 
important respects to enhance the democratic character of the Constitution—assuming 
that there are adequate checks on such a power not being used for incumbency protec-
tion or otherwise abused. 
Dec. 2010] DEMOCRACY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 439 
 
be self-defeating.87  For Friedman’s book also might be read to sug-
gest that, whether progressive or conservative, results on divisive is-
sues in constitutional law cannot in the long run be sustained without 
political support. 
Many Americans take pride in the longevity of their Constitution, 
viewing the Framers as having brought wisdom and public-
spiritedness towards its creation.  Most Americans understand that if 
the courts have concluded that something is a matter of right, that 
conclusion must be respected, without necessarily agreeing that 
rights exist only through judicial recognition.88  The Constitution was 
designed to be difficult to amend; many believe that difficulty has 
contributed to the stability and (relative) continuity of our constitu-
tional democracy and to the influence of and respect for Supreme 
Court decisions as representing the law to which obedience is owed. 
But admiration and affection for a constitution can become a dis-
abling, disempowering form of perfectionism, a belief that instead of 
being a product produced by imperfect humans, the text should be 
regarded as a sacred vessel that should not be tampered with by the 
mere mortals of the present age.89  Respect for the Supreme Court, 
which is essential to securing compliance with its judgments and to 
enabling the Court to play a settlement function in limiting the 
 
 87 See Michelman, supra note 81, at 1359 (expressing concern that opposition to any 
amendment of the Constitution may “connive with a terribly sad constitutional 
fate. . . . [helping to] make our political world . . . all distrust and no democracy”). 
 88 “I got my rights!” is a phrase that might represent an assertion of popular understanding 
and authority. 
 89 Cf. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9-17 (1988) (discussing the Constitution 
as a “sacred object”); Robin L. West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L. REV. 765, 791–92 
(1992) (arguing that the failure to debate the value of the Constitution has had negative 
effects); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kerchecal (July 12, 1816), in THE 
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 557–58 (M. Peterson ed., 1975) (suggesting that every 
twenty years or so the Constitution should be amended).  In this letter, Jefferson also ex-
pressed the following view: 
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them 
like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched.  They ascribe to the men of 
the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be 
beyond amendment.  I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it.  It 
deserved well of its country.  It was very like the present, but without the expe-
rience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a cen-
tury of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from 
the dead.  I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws 
and constitutions.  I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; be-
cause, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical 
means of correcting their ill effects.  But I know also, that laws and institutions 
must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. 
  Id. at 558–59. 
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points of continuing and divisive controversy,90 can nonetheless pass 
the point of being healthy in a democracy. 
Much of the academic literature assumes the primacy of the Su-
preme Court and focuses on critique or explanation of its decisions 
with a view to preserving or reforming its doctrine.  Other scholars 
criticize the primacy of the Court, but in radical terms—“taking the 
Constitution away” from the Court, or other arguments to prevent 
the Court from reviewing the constitutionality of legislation—that do 
not engage with questions of stability and amendment, perhaps be-
cause they are prepared to jettison a much larger part of our ongoing 
system.91  For those who do not seek to abolish judicial review, but be-
lieve that ruling out amendment as a response to seriously incorrect 
decisions is inappropriate, the hard questions are what kinds of issues 
warrant invocation of the amendment process.92  These are hard 
questions precisely because there is so much to the point that too 
many or too frequent amendments will have potentially adverse ef-
fects; and the empirical effects of more frequent amendment are un-
tested. 
Constitutional veneration should not exclude amendment.  As Ar-
ticle V suggests, the Court was never intended to have the final word 
on all matters constitutional.  At least five amendments have become 
part of the Constitution to respond to or overrule Supreme Court de-
cisions:  the Eleventh Amendment (1798), which overruled Chisholm 
v. Georgia’s holding concerning the Court’s jurisdiction over debt ac-
tions against states;93 the Thirteenth Amendment (1865), outlawing 
slavery and thus responding to Dred Scott v. Sanford’s holding that 
Congress lacked power to prohibit slavery by statute;94 the Fourteenth 
Amendment (1868), overruling Dred Scott’s pernicious interpretation 
 
 90 See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (1997).  But see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED 
CONSTITUTION:  A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2001) 
(arguing that the function of judicial review is to resist or “unsettle” results achieved by 
the political branches of government). 
 91 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 56. 
 92 For an effort to systematize thinking about the choice between common law adjudication 
or formal amendments, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the 
Constitutional Common Law, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH:  THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES 
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006). 
 93 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (abrogating Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), 
which upheld the Court’s original jurisdiction in a suit on a contract by a citizen of one 
state against another state). 
 94 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451–52 (1857). 
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of African-Americans as outside the citizenry of the United States;95 
the Sixteenth Amendment (1913), responding to the Pollock v. Far-
mer’s Loan & Trust Co. decision concerning the constitutionality of a 
federal income tax;96 and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (1971) to 
overrule a portion of the decision in Oregon v. Mitchell holding that 
Congress lacked power to extend the vote to eighteen-year-olds in 
state elections.97  The Nineteenth Amendment, moreover, rectified 
the constitutional status of women that had been reflected in such 
late-nineteenth-century decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment 
as Minor v. Happersett.98  Has the time come for the American people 
once again to express their disagreement with the Court over a fun-
damental aspect of American constitutionalism? 
Maybe so.  The decision prohibiting regulation of direct corporate 
expenditures on behalf of, or in opposition to, particular candidates 
makes a significant change in the structure of American election 
finance law—a structure that has been in place since well before the 
campaign finance reforms of the 1970s.  As early as 1907, Congress 
banned corporate political contributions to candidates.99  In the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947, Congress extended the ban to any expenditures 
by corporations to cover not only direct contributions but also inde-
pendent expenditures.100  Such provisions—in place for more than 
sixty years—are now undone. 
The consequences of the decision are not easy to predict; it is 
possible that there will not be significant change in corporate spend-
ing, but it is also possible that business corporations will take up the 
opportunity that the Court’s ruling provides.101  If they do, the risks 
are considerable. 
 
 95 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406–27, 454 (holding that under the Con-
stitution, African Americans could not be considered citizens as they were excluded from 
the original concept of “the people”). 
 96 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895) 
(holding that an income tax was unconstitutional). 
 97 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 124-30 (1970) (Black, 
J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 
 98 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (stating that the right to vote shall not be denied on account 
of sex); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875) (rejecting a woman’s 
constitutional claim to be entitled to vote, holding that the Constitution does not prohi-
bit states from allowing only men to vote in elections). 
 99 Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441(b) (2006)). 
100 Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, §§ 304, 313, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60. 
101 Many, though not all, commentators are of the view that the effect of Citizens United will 
be to increase the impact of corporate spending in election campaigns, including, in par-
ticular, campaigns for elected judicial office in the states.  See, e.g., James Sample, Court 
Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010); Adam Liptak, 
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The use of enormous concentrations of wealth, made possible be-
cause of legal fictions designed to facilitate the accumulation of capi-
tal in a market economy, to directly influence democratic elections 
arguably undermines the primacy of voter equality.  Markets and po-
litical democracy may reinforce each other in healthy ways; but unre-
strained corporate spending to elect, or defeat, candidates for public 
office arguably threatens the premise of political democracy, that is, 
of the equal standing of each voter.  The risks of allowing such corpo-
rate expenditures increases the likelihood of business interests having 
legislators who are “bought and paid for,” accountable primarily to 
business interests, rather than voters.  It is already a challenge for 
many members of legislatures to think independently about the pub-
lic interest when they must raise money from many individuals to 
fund their election campaigns.  But although individual access to 
wealth varies greatly, candidates who can appeal widely to many 
people of ordinary income still have a shot.  “Independent” corporate 
expenditures can be made in opposition to an incumbent candi-
date,102 in ways that afford opportunities for influence comparable to 
those created by direct donations; a threat to support an opponent 
may be a powerful negative incentive to an incumbent legislator.  Al-
lowing direct corporate expenditures of this sort (even if nominally 
“independent”) may well result in our democracy having many more 
legislators who feel beholden primarily to business interests.103 
 
Former Justice O’Connor Sees Ill in Election Finance Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at A16 
(reporting Justice O’Connor’s views); Richard Hasen, Bad News for Judicial Elections, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/how-
corporate-money-will-reshape-politics.  Others are somewhat less troubled.  See, e.g., Lau-
rence H. Tribe, What Should Congress Do About Citizens United?, SCOTUS BLOG (Jan. 24, 
2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/what-should-congress-do-about-citizens-
united (stating, “I share neither the jubilant sense that the First Amendment has scored a 
major triumph over misbegotten censorship nor the apocalyptic sense that the Court has 
ushered in an era of corporate dominance that threatens to drown out the voices of all 
but the best-connected and to render representative democracy all but meaningless,” es-
pecially in light of experience in those states that had not restricted corporate spending 
in state elections; calling for improved laws on disclosure).  And some praise the decision.  
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, More Messages, More Sources, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010),  
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/how-corporate-money-will-
reshape-politics/ (praising the decision as leveling the playing field between media and 
other business corporations).  
102 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17)(B) (defining an expenditure as “independent” if it is “not made in 
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of [a] candidate, the candi-
date’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its 
agents”). 
103 I do not consider here the possibility, proposed by some scholars, for required anonymity 
in contributions.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS:  A NEW 
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 6 (2002). 
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Moreover, if the opportunities created by the Court’s decision are 
fully exploited they risk a progression to a culture of corruption—
legalized corruption to be sure—in American politics and business.  
Given corporate profits, the costs of buying elections may seem small.  
Is there a risk of increased expenditures on political campaigns in an 
escalating arms race of corporate interest (the technology industry 
versus agriculture, for example) to have their favored candidates in 
office?  If so, this might enhance the impact of corporate money, to 
the detriment of ordinary voters and possibly to the detriment of the 
market economy:  If businesses begin to focus more resources and at-
tention on purchasing political power, their focus on market perfor-
mance and innovation may decline. 
Is it time to consider amending the Constitution to restore legisla-
tive authority to regulate (or prohibit) corporate expenditures in 
elections?  There are, to be sure, serious risks in pursuing such a 
course, to be discussed below.  Yet there may be countervailing rea-
sons to at least give real consideration to an amendment as a re-
sponse to Citizens United, in addition to or in place of some of the sta-
tutory or other measures being proposed.  For it is possible that the 
changes that could ensue from this decision would be self-
entrenching, in ways that would defeat the possibility for later politi-
cal correction through ordinary lawmaking or constitutional 
amendments insofar as they require legislative passage.  And refusing 
to consider amendment as one way to respond to a course of Su-
preme Court decisions that are believed to be incorrect on so signifi-
cant a question unnecessarily removes an important democratic ele-
ment of accountability from the socio-legal context of the 
Constitution as a whole. 
First, on the possibility of self-entrenching corporate and political 
behaviors:  If corporate spending increases in the ways permitted by 
this ruling, and if more legislators feel under the influence of corpo-
rate interests (at least to the extent of having to avoid having them 
fund their opponents), it may become increasingly difficult to find 
legislators willing to propose either an amendment or legislation that 
might pass judicial scrutiny.  Legislators who have grown to fear the 
possibility of large corporate spending to secure their defeat at the 
next election are very unlikely to be willing to promote legislation or 
constitutional amendments that corporations disapprove of, whether 
in campaign spending or on matters of substantive policy.  Corporate 
political action committees (“PACs”) may have some of this potential, 
but the amount of funds available through corporate treasuries and 
the greater ease of their use raise the possibility of a much greater 
corporate role in elections in the future than we have at present.  
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And the potential for such self-entrenching effects of corporate 
spending—freed from regulation by the Court’s decision—is a special 
factor favoring judicial overruling (not to be expected) or amend-
ment, and sooner rather than later. 
Second, on democracy:  The Constitution represents, as most con-
stitutions do, a balance between commitments to democracy (in the 
sense that the people of the polity retain the power ultimately to con-
trol its course) and commitment to sound principles of design and 
aspirations to justice, including the principle of judicial indepen-
dence.  The provisions for amending the Constitution are plainly 
written and specific, suggesting that enacting an amendment violates 
no rule of law conception of the Constitution as a stable governing 
instrument.  The amendment process of Article V requires that mul-
tiple majorities in many locations must be convinced of the need to 
act—whether in response to a judicial decision or otherwise—before 
a change in the text can be made.104  Although the amendment 
process has been criticized for being too rigid (in the sense of de-
manding more supermajorities than many other modern constitu-
tions), it surely cannot be faulted for making amendment too easy.  
Friedman’s book offers an important set of explanations for why evo-
lution in the law by interpretation is not inconsistent with democracy; 
but it offers no claim that evolution by interpretation is more demo-
cratically legitimate than change that is made by constitutional 
amendment. 
Political fights about who is appointed to the Court are a much 
more indirect way for a democratic polity to redirect constitutional 
law; they also permit constitutional law to be redirected (perhaps for 
long periods) based on what may be relatively short-term political 
shifts in the Presidency and the Senate, in some contrast to the kind 
of mass political action required to initiate and succeed in the 
amendment process.  As will be noted below, there may be socio-
cultural costs of moving to amend, especially of moving to amend a 
rights-protecting part of the Constitution, costs that may affect the 
willingness of the Court and our society in the future to protect the 
 
104 Requiring multiple and/or supermajority votes is perhaps not a bad procedural indicia of 
the kind of issue on which amendments should be sought, although substantive criteria 
might also play a role in guiding those dissatisfied with a judicial decision as to when to 
seek to invoke this process and when not to.  On procedure:  If one were drafting an 
amendment process today, greater care might be taken to assure that there is a national 
population majority in the second phase of that process and that this majority has some 
degree of generational contemporaneousness.  See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION ch. 
VIII, § 128 (requiring a majority of the states and a majority vote of the entire population 
to amend the constitution). 
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rights of those with whom public officials or a majority of the popula-
tion disagrees.  But there are also costs to the democratic spirit and 
the foundation of the Constitution in public consent to ruling 
amendment out.105 
Kathleen Sullivan distinguished, in her attack on “amendmenti-
tis,” “structural” reasons from more transitory ones, recognizing that 
structural concerns about the entrenchment of political power might 
appropriately support amendment.106  There is a serious argument 
that the effects of corporate spending on the democratic, representa-
tive quality of our elected officials represents a significant “structural” 
reason for amendment.  In the context of interpretation and invali-
dation of legislation, John Hart Ely famously argued for judicial re-
straint except when there was good reason to believe the political 
process would not self-correct, whether because of prejudice against 
minorities or because of existing and entrenched obstructions to the 
proper working of the democratic process.107  The suggestion here is 
that invoking the constitutional amendment process—and the re-
lated higher degree of public involvement that it can occasion—may 
be appropriate where a Court decision itself has the effect of en-
trenching obstructions to the working of the democratic process in 
ways that will prevent that process from self-correcting in the future.108  
Yet, as discussed below, the potential that such an amendment could 
have an adverse effect on the constitutional protections for a vibrant 
democracy must also be considered. 
As noted above, there are a number of serious objections and 
possible risks to the course of seeking an amendment.  Will an 
amendment in response to a decision concerning “rights” under the 
First Amendment be interpreted by the Court to have radiating ef-
fects in enhancing government powers over speech more generally?  
Will an amendment in response to a Court decision “chasten” or in-
timidate the Court into not taking other decisions it fears will be un-
popular?  Will enacting an amendment in this circumstance encour-
 
105 Cf. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty (May 21, 1944) in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY PAPERS 
AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960) (“Liberty lies in 
the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can 
even do much to help it.  While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to 
save it.”). 
106 See sources cited supra note 10. 
107 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
108 See generally CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83 (discussing guidelines for 
constitutional amendments that make our system of government more politically respon-
sive). 
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age disrespect for the Constitution, or lead to a plethora of amend-
ments that could be destabilizing?  Would it open up other issues for 
amendment that opponents of Citizens United would not want to see? 
Efforts to enact a constitutional amendment might be viewed by 
some as an undesirable concession that Citizens United was correctly 
decided.  Is this a substantial reason not to seek an amendment?  Was 
it a mistake to seek a child labor amendment in response to Hammer 
v. Dagenhart?109  The effort to seek amendment did not prevent later 
successful efforts to change doctrine, in the movement from Hammer 
to the later New Deal cases.  Likewise, the effort to obtain enactment 
of the Equal Rights Amendment may have facilitated the adoption of 
reasonably serious review of gender discrimination.  True, the pen-
dency of an amendment movement might be taken by some Justices 
as a reason for caution in moving away from the prior decision;110 but 
at the same time, its progress in the states might also help persuade 
others to rethink their understandings. 
Second, as noted above, if an amendment were successful, impor-
tant concerns about the scope of its interpretive effects across the 
whole Constitution would have to be considered.  There is no doubt 
some uncertainty.  Narrowly crafted amendments have on occasion 
been read very broadly;111 but in some ways the existence of a text may 
 
109 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute prohibiting the shipment 
in interstate commerce of goods made through child labor), overruled by United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941). 
110 Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (holding a 
statutory gender classification unconstitutional).  In his separate opinion, Justice Powell 
disagreed with the plurality’s view that gender classifications should be subject to the 
strictest form of scrutiny, and referred to the pendency of the Equal Rights Amendment 
as a reason not to adopt a “compelling state interest” test for strict scrutiny of gender clas-
sifications.  He wrote:   
The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of this 
precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratifica-
tion by the States.  If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent the will of 
the people accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.  By acting 
prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional re-
sponsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the tradi-
tional democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment.  It seems to 
me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision 
which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for 
duly prescribed legislative processes. 
  Id. 
111 The Court’s Eleventh Amendment case law provides an example.  Ever since Hans v. Lou-
isiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (concluding that the Amendment, which in terms prohibited 
suits by out-of-state citizens against a state, also precluded suits by a state’s own citizens 
against the state), the Amendment has been read to stand for far more than its literal 
language embraces.  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999) (“To rest on the 
words of the Amendment alone would be to engage in the type of ahistorical literalism we 
have rejected in [the past . . . .]”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 
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merely provide an occasion for movement in an unexpected direc-
tion.  In the first generation or so it seems likely that an amendment 
will be read to do what it was intended to do; after that, the realm of 
constitutional interpretive politics will require engagement to assure 
that its use is appropriate.  There may well be risks that the amend-
ment will have “radiating” effects, and would in the future be inter-
preted to permit greater government regulation of other forms of 
speech, or alternatively, of spending on other activities protected by 
the Constitution.112  This would count as a worry, one that can be ad-
dressed—but without guarantees of success—by careful drafting of 
the amendment and its supporting explanations. 
Third, it might be argued that resort to the difficult and time con-
suming amendment process should not be pursued until other, statu-
tory approaches are exhausted; or that pursuing an amendment will 
sap political energy away from a more attainable and equally, if not 
more, effective legislative solution.  Is there a principle of good con-
stitutional behavior (or what we might call “pro-constitutional beha-
vior”) not to resort to amendment until it is clear that statutory fixes 
won’t work?  There is much to be said for that kind of presumption, 
for many of the reasons Sullivan discussed.  But, as indicated above, 
there is at least some reason to worry that what we are facing may be a 
change in practice by business corporations that, if it gets going in 
substantial terms, may become entrenched in American politics in 
ways that over time will make it more and more difficult to undo and 
that may affect a wide range of issues on which business interests are 
in play.  And it seems quite unclear whether efforts to mobilize sup-
port for an amendment will sap energy from legislative fixes rather 
than generate it. 
Some raise objections to amending the First Amendment that 
draw on both institutional and substantive concerns as follows:  The 
protection of freedom of speech is central to the viability of a robust 
democracy; the temptations to governments to stifle such speech are 
 
(1996) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what 
it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.” (quoting Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991))).  For a related example see Michelman, su-
pra note 81, at 1360-61, noting the possibility that a narrowly crafted flag-burning 
amendment might “unravel the whole fabric of first amendment doctrine,” in discussing 
Walter Dellinger’s testimony opposing a constitutional amendment to overturn the 
Court’s flag-burning case law.  See also infra note 124. 
112 Cf. Deborah Hellman, Money Talks But It Isn’t Speech 19 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, Work-
ing Paper, No. 2010-18), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1586377 (discussing how 
regulation of expenditures to engage in constitutionally protected activity is distinct from 
regulating the protected activity itself). 
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well known; courts are the institutions least likely to require and most 
likely to protect against curtailment of speech in ways that damage 
the democratic process; and thus, in order to maintain a culture of 
robust and competitive speech a “prophylactic” approach must be 
taken that includes strong presumptions to avoid direct challenges 
(whether through amendment or otherwise) of judicial decisions en-
forcing rights of free speech (however erroneous those decisions are 
believed to be).  This syllogism could be attacked.113  But even if one 
grants this set of arguments, there remains the question whether an 
occasion has arisen in which that presumption should be overcome. 
Although the First Amendment’s language plainly implies protec-
tions of the ability of individuals, and the press, to speak freely, its 
language alone is silent on whether freedom of speech means the 
freedom of business corporations to spend unregulated amounts of 
treasury money to do so.  Indeed the text alone, with its specific pro-
tection of the “press,” might be read to imply otherwise.114  The Court 
having interpreted the First Amendment to prohibit legislative regu-
lation of corporate treasury expenditures on behalf of, or opposed to, 
particular candidates in particular elections, an amendment to ad-
dress this narrow, but important, question should not be beyond the 
capacity of good lawyers to draft in ways that do not impair the 
Court’s capacity or inclination to enforce protections of individual 
speech rights—including the ability of individuals to pool their re-
sources, as in PACs, or political parties, or membership associations 
to amplify individual voices through collective action.115  Although 
 
113 For example, some might argue that the courts are no less likely to suppress speech than 
the other branches, but only that their opportunities to do so are more curtailed.  Or it 
might be argued that prophylaxis is unnecessary or imposes other costs that are too high. 
114 See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (noting that the press 
is “the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection”).  
But cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797–801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring) (rejecting idea that press clause confers special status on press). 
115 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 452 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Freedom of ex-
pression embraces more than the right of an individual to speak his mind.  It includes also 
his right to advocate and his rights to join with his fellows in an effort to make that advocacy 
effective.” (emphasis added)).  Although the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
generally does not distinguish among rights claimants based on their individual, associa-
tional, or corporate status, the character of a regulated entity as a for-profit business, ra-
ther than as an individual or a real membership association of a not-for-profit character 
that is concerned with advancing social or political purposes, may be relevant to the legi-
timate justifications of government action in some First Amendment contexts.  See Austin 
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 665–66 (1990) (distinguishing among ent-
ities subject to regulation of their political expenditures based on their purposes, on 
whether their members or shareholders have incentives to disassociate from political acts 
they disagree with and on whether they are independent from influence by business cor-
porations), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); 
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many are attached and attracted to the clarity of the First Amend-
ment’s command, “Congress shall make no law,” it is equally clear 
that what “no law” means has been subject to considerable judicial in-
terpretation.  Some laws prohibiting speech (i.e., obscene speech, 
fraudulent speech) are permitted, so the “no law” part of the 
Amendment functions as a strong exhortation and presumption 
more than an operative rule.  That is, interpretation of the First 
Amendment has resulted in a jurisprudence whose complexity belies 
the apparent clarity of the “make no law” language.  The idea some-
times propounded, that an amendment would be the first “excep-
tion” to the principle of free speech, ignores the judicially recognized 
exceptions—for fraud, for obscenity, for defamation—long accepted. 
There are, to be sure, important technical and legal challenges to 
drafting an amendment that would accomplish its goals without over-
empowering legislatures.  First, there may be important issues of sub-
stance on which proponents of an amendment disagree, concerning 
both the intended scope of a proposed amendment, and the best way 
to craft it, on which agreement would need to be reached.116  Wheth-
 
Fed. Election Comm’n. v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding 
FECA limits on corporate treasury expenditures in elections unconstitutional as applied 
to a nonprofit public interest group’s expenditures).  Compare Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85–88 (1980) (upholding state law prohibiting bans on public ex-
pressive activities in shopping centers against claim by shopping center of First Amend-
ment right to exclude such activities on its property), with Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 
U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (invalidating state anti-discrimination law as applied to prohibit 
Scouts from excluding gay scout leaders as a violation of their First Amendment associa-
tional rights) and Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 581–82 (2000) (invalidat-
ing state law requiring “blanket” primaries from which political parties could not exclude 
voters from outside the party). 
116 Some might favor broader proposals designed to permit regulation of all corporate 
speech that the Court has found prohibited by the First Amendment.  See We the People?  
Corporate Spending in America After Citizens United:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Jeffrey Clements, General Counsel of Free 
Speech for People) (criticizing corporate speech doctrines more generally).  Others 
might disagree:  Even if one does not conceive of corporations as having rights like hu-
man beings, one can conceive of government attacking or suppressing corporate speech, 
because it disagrees, in ways that would diminish the vibrancy of our discourse.  Moreo-
ver, it may be that some corporations would be willing to have a uniform rule in place 
that would prohibit them—and their competitors—from using corporate money to fund 
election campaigns.  Corporations will not readily give up their other speech rights but 
might be quite happy to be relieved of the need to respond in election after election to 
candidate expectations of (if not requests for) expenditures.  That is, a more narrowly-
tailored amendment might appeal to the enlightened self-interest of business corpora-
tions in obtaining a uniform rule that would bind their competitors and take the issue of 
direct expenditures to influence elections off the table.  For discussion of some of the po-
litical dynamics and advantages of amendment processes, see Mary Ziegler, Ways to 
Change:  A Reevaluation of Article V Campaigns and Legislative Constitutionalism, 2009 BYU L. 
REV. 969. 
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er an amendment should authorize the regulation of all speech by 
“corporations,” or of all “political speech” by corporations (along the 
lines offered by Maryland Congresswoman Donna Edwards in House 
Joint Resolution 74)117, or only of corporate expenditures for “elec-
tioneering” activities on behalf of or in opposition to candidates for 
public office, raise difficult questions.  On any approach, maintaining 
an exception for legitimate press activities would seem essential to the 
health of a democratic polity; if such an amendment, with such an 
exception, were to become law, it would be far more important than 
it has been up to now for legislatures and courts to provide definition 
to the contours of “the press,” a challenge of translation forward from 
the presses of the eighteenth century to the twenty-first-century mul-
timedia journalistic complex, including online reporting and the 
“free press” role of blogs.118  There are risks of an amendment being 
read both too narrowly and too broadly:  too narrow a reading, such 
as that given the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment through the Slaughter-house Cases,119 would allow Con-
gress and the state legislatures too little room for legislation; too 
broad a reading might allow too much room for regulation of cam-
paign finance and, as noted earlier, possibly loosen the constraints on 
government regulation of speech across a much broader swathe. 
Thus, much would depend on the scope, clarity, and understood 
meanings of a proposed amendment.  For example, one current pro-
posal for an amendment states that “Congress and the States may re-
gulate the expenditure of funds for political speech by any corpora-
tion, limited liability company, or other corporate entity.”120  Imagine 
that a future city council prohibited corporate expenditures for 
speech in favor of “tax free zones,” but not other corporate speech; 
or imagine, perhaps more remotely, a prohibition on corporate 
speech on behalf of Republicans, but not speech on behalf of Demo-
 
117 H.R.J. Res. 74, 111th Cong. 2d Sess. (2010).  The operative language of the proposed 
amendment reads as follows: 
Section 1.  The sovereign right of the people to govern being essential to a free 
democracy, Congress and the States may regulate the expenditure of funds for po-
litical speech by any corporation, limited liability company, or other corporate ent-
ity. 
Section 2.  Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to abridge the 
freedom of the press. 
118 On translation, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171–73 
(1993) (analogizing the practice of faithfully interpreting laws over time to the practice of 
translation in language).  Just as the Fourth Amendment’s ban on searches and seizures 
was translated forward to apply to electronic eavesdropping and oversight, so too the 
eighteenth-century concept of the press is capable of being translated forward. 
119 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
120 H.R.J. Res. 74; see supra note 117. 
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crats:  Would the language of this amendment be read to shelter such 
regulations from attack as violations of the Due Process or Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the Constitution?  Is there a risk that such an 
amendment would be construed as a plenary grant of authority not 
subject to limitations by any already existing provisions of the Consti-
tution?121 
Would an amendment drafted, instead, to say “The First Amendment 
shall not be construed to prohibit Congress and the states from regulat-
ing the expenditure of funds for political speech by any corporation,” 
better avoid this risk?  Would it allow more room for a court to pro-
hibit, as a violation of the due process or equal protection standards, 
such partisan (and, in current First Amendment lingo, “viewpoint-
based”) distinctions?122  Or would this version (or perhaps other ver-
sions) of such a hypothetical amendment allow too much room for 
courts to use other clauses of the Constitution to re-impose most or 
 
121 Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (disagreeing with the Court’s First Amendment analysis of the constitutionality of 
a “hate speech” statute and arguing that “[a] defamation statute that drew distinctions on 
the basis of political affiliation or ‘an ordinance prohibiting only those legally obscene 
works that contain criticism of the city government,’ [quoting the majority] would un-
questionably fail rational-basis review” under the Equal Protection Clause). 
122 An alternative might be an amendment whose first section went something like this: 
The First Amendment shall not be construed to prohibit Congress and the states 
from regulating the expenditure of funds for political speech or communications, 
on behalf of or in opposition to the election of one or more candidates for public 
office, by any corporation. 
   Narrowing the grant of authority to the regulation of corporate expenditures of 
funds for electioneering activity would leave existing First Amendment protections of other 
corporate speech on political issues in place.  For those opposed in principle to parity for 
corporate persons (as compared to natural persons) in the protection of constitutional 
rights in general, or free speech rights in particular, this may be unacceptably narrow.  
However, the heart of the democratic process in a representative democracy like ours 
seems most directly in play in the election of public officials, at least at the federal level 
where referenda are not allowed.  Corporate speech on public issues can be valuable, par-
ticularly where the issues are about which business corporations, or labor unions, have 
special knowledge and the risks of government suppression based on viewpoint might be 
considerable.  An amendment drafted to say only that “the First Amendment shall not be 
construed to prohibit” would not remove the possibility of due process or equal protec-
tion challenges, allowing judicial review under those clauses to prevent abusive or discri-
minatory regulation (though carrying with it a risk that these latter clauses might be re-
lied on to undo the intended effect of the amendment).  Perhaps most importantly, an 
amendment narrowly drawn to authorize government regulation only of electioneering 
speech might actually win support from many corporations, see supra, note 116, thus in-
creasing the chances of its being enacted.   
   Other issues would need to be addressed, including the scope of an exception for the 
press, which any such amendment ought to include, and whether the amendment should 
authorize legislative regulation of all corporate and limited liability entities or only of 
those posing the special risks of for-profit business corporations and not-for-profits closely 
related to or funded by for-profit businesses. 
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all of the doctrine the amendment is designed to overturn?  The lat-
ter result would appear to require so much bad faith in judicial inter-
pretation that it seems most unlikely, at least soon after enactment; 
plainly such an amendment would have been intended to have some 
effect in permitting regulation not previously permitted.  But there is 
much to be debated and discussed as to the form of an amendment, 
and its intended effects on allowing legislative discretion.123 
 
* * * 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to analyze all of these issues 
or to draw a firm conclusion on whether, given the risks and benefits, 
an amendment of the Constitution is the most appropriate response 
to Citizens United, or if it is, what form it should take.  The suggestion 
is, however, that notwithstanding Friedman’s book, the people 
should at times seriously consider amendments; and, moreover, that 
there are some reasons why the Citizens United decision is an appro-
priate occasion for such serious consideration. 
The hesitation of people of constitutional goodwill to seek 
amendment of the Constitution is understandable, and, in many re-
spects, wise.  But at the same time, “amendophobia,” or a tendency to 
discount amendment as a possible response to a constitutional deci-
sion also might be thought to sap the system of an important method 
of reinvigorating our Constitution and of maintaining an appropriate 
balance between judicial interpretation and public decision making 
over what the Constitution should mean.  Barry Friedman’s argument 
that 1937 represented a decision by the people that constitutional 
amendment through interpretation was legitimate if the interpreta-
tion was within some mainstream set of beliefs was not, I assume, 
meant to suggest that Article V amendment has been or should be 
abandoned as a method of legitimate constitutional change. 
The “will of the people” can be expressed in many ways, and there 
is something to be said for its expression in a written text, through a 
formal process of iterative discussion and voting, with the acknowl-
 
123 A proposed amendment in the 1990s reportedly would have sought to overturn that part 
of Buckley v. Valeo that prohibited legislatures from imposing expenditure limits on can-
didates, by authorizing Congress and the states to establish money limits on the amounts 
candidates could spend on elections.  See CITIZENS FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83, 
at 4–5; see also H.R.J. Res. 119, 105th Cong. (1998).  Questions have been raised whether 
such an approach would be too narrow, in not allowing the government to regulate issue 
advocacy that may be aimed at influencing elections of particular candidates.  CITIZENS 
FOR THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 83, at 19. 
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edged purposes of achieving constitutional change.124  So Barry 
Friedman’s book not only provides a compelling narrative of the Su-
preme Court’s relationship to the “will of the people,” but raises large 
questions for us to consider and for future research.125  These ques-
tions are not only about whether the Justices are “independent” 
enough, but also about whether “the people” have allowed the Article 
V amendment power to atrophy.  Do we now have a constitutional 
“convention” against formal amendments?  Or can the “will of the 
people” shift modalities and reassert itself through the formal 
amendment process?  Friedman’s eloquent and thoughtful narrative 
of the role of public opinion in shaping the Supreme Court’s choices 
is a joy to read.  Perhaps in the future he will bring his analytical, his-
torical, and narrative talents to bear on other modalities for constitu-
tional change. 
 
124 When the “flag burning” amendment was proposed in response to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 
310 (1990), some commentators argued that such an amendment would itself be uncons-
titutional.  See Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1073–74 (1991) (arguing that the right to free speech is a natural right retained by 
the people that cannot be taken away “even by consent”).  Given the Court’s retreat from 
reviewing even procedural challenges to the amendment process, see Coleman v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 433 (1939), there is very little likelihood that the Court would even consider a 
substantive challenge to an amendment.  Moreover, it would be difficult to make a con-
vincing argument sounding in the premises of constitutionalism for the Court to declare 
an amendment substantively unconstitutional:  The great difficulty and multiple delibera-
tion and filter points for amending the U.S. Constitution increases the likelihood that an 
amendment will reflect a substantial supermajority in favor of the change, and there is no 
positive basis in constitutional text to declare an amendment substantively unconstitu-
tional, with the exception of the provisions of Article V relating to equal suffrage in the 
Senate.  See Vicki C. Jackson, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments (Aug. 11, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript ) (on file with author). 
125 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 373–74 (suggesting that “[w]hat we know is tentative,” and 
may be seen as “an agenda for further research,” that can “move past the question of 
whether the justices are influenced by popular opinion . . . [and] tackle the really mea-
ningful question of when and how the justices are free to stand up to the popular will in 
the name of the Constitution”). 
